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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MANING OF
PROMPT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PRIOR
RESTRAINT DOCTRINE AFTER FWIPBS V.
CITY OF DALLAS'
INTRODUCTION
Of all the rights afforded by the United States Constitu-
tion, perhaps none is more valued than an individual's First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression.2 The
passion this hallowed right engenders is surpassed probably
only by the heated debate concerning the parameters of state
control of individual expression.3 While some strongly advo-
cate the government's interests in regulating certain types of
offensive expression in favor of order and morality,' others rec-
ognize the right to this type of expression as the cornerstone of
American freedom and democracy.' This fundamental dis-
1 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-96 (1949) (Justice Reed's majority
opinion and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion discussing the First
Amendments "preferred position"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US. 105, 115
(1943) (asserting that the freedom of speech represents an individual right which
is superior to others); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319, 327 (1937), cueruled on
other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784 (1969) (Justice Cardozo de-
scribing the freedom of speech as the "indispensable condition [ of nearly every
other form of freedom").
3 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSIUTIrONAL LAW § 12-36, at
734 n.12 (1978) (noting the "confusion" in the Supreme Court's case law regarding
prior restraints); Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 649 (1955) (stating that 'despite an ancient and celebrated
history," the doctrine of prior restraints "remains today curiously confused and
unformed").
' See, eg., Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (N.D. Ten. 1986)
(noting that zoning and licensing laws operate to preserve the moral character of
the majority, while first amendment rights operate to protect the minority from
those interests), affd sub nor. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th
Cir. 1988), affd in part, reu'd in part, 493 US. 215 (1990).
' See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 US. 546, 553 (1975)
(noting that America's "distaste for censorship-reflecting the natural distaste of a
free people-is deep-written into our law"); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS vucIH RESr UoN TE LEGLATIVE PowER OF
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agreement over the appropriate amount of government linita-
tion of expression is at the heart of the debate over the federal
courts' interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision in
FWIPBS v. City of Dallas.'
In FW/PBS, the Supreme Court addressed the problems
that arise when unfettered discretion rests in the hands of
state and city officials. Through licensing, zoning, and inspec-
tion requirements, administrative officials design ordinances to
curtail the availability of licenses to controversial enterprises.
More often than not, these ordinances focus on the adult enter-
tainment industry, but they also operate to impose restrictions
on a wide variety of controversial expression! As the Supreme
Court has recognized, these licensing schemes, by limiting
speech prior to dissemination, can have a chilling effect on
speech.'
Given the problems associated with licensing schemes, the
Supreme Court has adopted exacting procedural requirements
to ensure that first amendment rights are not compromised.9
Through these procedural rules, all materials are presumptive-
ly protected by the First Amendment, and prior restraints on
expression are prohibited without either a showing of extreme
danger or instituting judicial procedures. ° In Freedman v.
Maryland," the Court identified three procedural safeguards
which must be adhered to in order to find a licensing scheme
constitutional: (1) that the state bear the burden of instituting
THE STATES OF THE AIERICAN UNION 886 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927).
6 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (regulation of commercial advertising of casinos); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (judicial "gag" orders against the press in
criminal cases); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (denying access to a
public forum); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (denying mail privileges); Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (licensing requirement in film
industry); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (permit requirement to use
public places for expressive activities).
' Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975) (stating that while a criminal statute
"chills," a prior restraint "freezes"); infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 517 (1958) (noting that procedural safe-
guards play an important role in protecting free expression; indeed, they "assume
an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be
applied").
'o Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721-22 (1931).
n 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
[Vol. 62:12171218
PROMPT JUDICAL REVIEW
judicial procedures and that it carry the burden of proof in
court; (2) that the governing authority decide whether to issue
a license within a reasonable time while maintaining the sta-
tus quo; and (3) that the statute provide for "prompt judicial
review."' Courts and scholars alike have lauded these proce-
dural requirements as providing perhaps the most effective
protection of free expression. 3
The Supreme Court's decision in FW/PBS," however,
seriously eroded the procedural requirements first articulated
in Freedman. In FWIPBS, the Court held that the first Freed-
man requirement-that the administrator bear the burden of
proof-was unnecessary in the context of licensing schemes.z
In addition, although Justice O'Connor never explicitly ad-
dressed the issue, the opinion contained language that could be
construed as modifying Freedman's prompt judicial review re-
quirement."
In fact, since FWIPBS a number of federal courts have
siezed on the language in Justice O'Connor's opinion as justify-
ing a less restrictive approach to the requirement. While the
Supreme Court has never explicitly defined prompt judicial re-
view, the safeguard had been interpreted in prior decisions to
require a judicial decision within a specified, brief time. '
Mere access to judicial review had never been held sufficient to
satisfy the requirement." However, it could be argued that,
Id. at 58-60.
13 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1970) (noting that the procedures are
"built-in safeguards against curtailment of constitutionally protected expression);
see generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Prccess," 83 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1970).
14 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
'5 Id. at 229-30.
16 Id. at 228-30.
" See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 US. 676, 690 n.22
(1968) (noting that a final judicial decision includes the trial stage); United States
v. Book Bin, 306 F. Supp. 1023, 1026-28 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (holding a federal statute
authorizing the Postmaster General to detain mail unconstitutional because the in-
terim judicial restraint falling short of a final determination of obscenity failed to
alleviate the prolonged threat of an adverse administrative decision and thus was
"a severe restriction on the exercise of defendant's First Amendment rights"), affd
sub nom. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
1 See, eg., TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-36, at 735 n.9 (stating that 'lilt is clear
that it is the decision, and not merely the hearing, which must be prompt);
Monaghan, supra note 13, at 534 n.61 (noting that the Supreme Court's earlier
jurisprudence required a "speedy resolution of the merits? and describing it as a
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based on Justice O'Connor's language in FW/PBS, the post-
FW/PBS Court envisions something less than a judicial deter-
mination as satisfying the requirement. For example, in her
opinion Justice O'Connor noted that it is the "possibility of," or
the provision of "an avenue for," prompt judicial review that is
the essence of the safeguard. 9
Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor's ambiguous references
to the requirement has led to a split of interpretation in the
circuits. At least three courts of appeals have interpreted
prompt judicial review as requiring only access to judicial re-
view within a brief period, rather than a judicial determination
on the merits. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that
the availability of a state's common law writ of certiorari is
sufficient to meet the prompt judicial review requirement.20
The First and Fifth Circuits, meanwhile, have held that where
an applicant is denied a license, the ordinance need only pro-
vide access to a judicial proceeding.2
The Fourth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other
hand, have rejected the interpretation that Freedman's prompt
judicial review requirement was modified by FW/PBS. Accord-
ingly, they have held that ordinances providing only access to
judicial review do not sufficiently protect first amendment
rights to freedom of expression.22
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
FW/PBS did not modify the prompt judicial review require-
ment as it was first articulated in Freedman. It also argues
that the lack of a definitive explanation as to when a judicial
determination must be sought creates the danger of further
"salutory limitation"); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 62 (1984) (arguing that
prior restraints are especially disfavored when they are imposed "prior to a full
and fair hearing in an independent judicial forum to determine whether the chal-
lenged expression is constitutionally protected").
SFWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 227-28.
20 See Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994).
2" See Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Tex., 27 F.3d 1068, 1070 (5th
Cir. 1994); TIs Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir.
1994); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319,
1327 (1st Cir. 1993).
' See 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988,
999-1000 (4th Cir. 1995); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d
220, 224-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995).
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erosion of Freedman's procedural requirements. Accordingly,
this Note proposes that, in order to prevent the unwarranted
suppression of expression through licensing schemes, the pro-
cedural requirement be explicitly interpreted as requiring a ju-
dicial determination on the merits, rather than simple access
to a judicial forum.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of first amend-
ment rights in the context in which these disputes often
arise-obscenity cases. This Part also outlines the historical
development of the doctrine of prior restraint and the proce-
dural requirements designed to curb the inherent dangers
associated with them. Finally, this Part examines various
courts' interpretations of prompt judicial review in other con-
texts, including the Supreme Cours decision in FWIPBS. Part
H discusses the split that has developed in the circuit courts
over whether FWIPBS did in fact alter the meaning of prompt
judicial review. Finally, Part III focuses on the plurality deci-
sion of FWIPBS and argues that neither the language nor pol-
icy considerations in Justice O'Connor's opinion suggest an
intent to modify Freedman's prompt judicial review require-
ment. This Part also articulates a proposed definition of
prompt judicial review and concludes that, at least in the first
amendment context, prompt judicial review requires a judicial
determination.
I. THE FMRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRIOR RESTRANT
DoCTRiNE iN THE OBSCENITY CONTEXT BEFORE FWIPBS
A full understanding of the issues requires an examination
of the relevant constitutional guarantees under the First
Amendment, the historical development and reasons behind
the doctrine of prior restraint, and the development of proce-
dural due process requirements to protect first amendment
interests in the context of obscenity.
1996] 1221
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A. Constitutional Guarantees under the First Amendment and
Obscenity
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... ))23
Central to the freedoms protected by the Constitution, the
freedom of speech and thought is the "indispensable condition
[ ] of nearly every other form of freedom."24 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court affords speech significant protection from sup-
pression. Because of the importance of the right of free expres-
sion, even unpopular ideas are usually afforded constitutional
protection.' Persons do not, however, enjoy an absolute right
to express all ideas in every context.26 State and city officials
often have a strong interest in regulating certain types of ex-
pression.2' For example, the Supreme Court has recognized
that protected speech can be subject to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions within a public forum.28 In order to
prevent wrongful suppression of speech, any regulation on the
23 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
2 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (prohibiting community
suppression of ideas merely because they are "unpopular, annoying or distasteful").
21 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554 (1975)
(noting that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the proposition that the
First Amendment's protection "includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit,
at least once, any and every kind of motion picture) (quoting Times Film Corp. v.
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1961)); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CoNsTrTUIONAL LAW § 16.7(b), at 942-43 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining that
while the First Amendment appears to be written in absolute terms, the position
that all expression is absolutely protected has never been adopted by the Supreme
Court).
' See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47.48
(1986) (deeming ordinance responsive to valid government interest of curtailing
problems associated with adult theaters); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (holding city's interest in regulating commercial property
outweighed impact of locational restriction); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) (stating regulation justified if it furthers important government
interest).
' See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (stat-




part of the government must be content neutral, narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open alternative opportunities for communication.'
Other types of speech are not afforded any protection un-
der the Constitution. Expression of ideas that pose "a clear and
present danger" of producing lawless action or imminent dan-
gers,30 and "fighting words" which "tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace"3' are not protected. In addition, in
Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court explicitly held that
obscenity was not constitutionally protected speech. There,
the Court defined obscene material as that which "to the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as whole appeals to
prurient interest."' This became the leading standard for de-
termining whether speech was obscene and, thus, unprotected.
The Supreme Court further refined the Roth test for ob-
scenity in Miller v. California.' After affirming the principle
in Roth that obscene speech is unprotected, the Court estab-
lished a three-part test for obscene speech:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest... ; Cb) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. =
Although Miller was subjected to minor clarifications in
later decisions, it continues to be the guideline used to deter-
mine whether certain forms of expression are obscene. Each
component of the test must be satisfied for the speech to be
classified as obscene.36 Consequently, any speech found to be
obscene pursuant to the test in Miller is not constitutionally
protected.
' United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
354 U.S. 476 (1959), ouerruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3Id. at 489.
s Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
"Id. at 24 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
" Penthouse Intl, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363 (5th Cir.), cert. dis.
missed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980).
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B. The Prior Restraint Doctrine Prior to FW/PBS
According to the Court, obscenity is not within the realm
of constitutional protection because the Court considers it to
lack any social importance.37 Until such speech or expression
is found obscene, however, it must be afforded a degree of
protection from censorship or limitation.8 This requirement
represents an important tenet embodied in the doctrine of
prior restraint.39 Broadly defined, a prior restraint is any
"scheme which gives public officials the power to deny use of a
forum in advance of its actual expression."40 It prohibits au-
thorities from stopping speeches, published works, or other
types of expression from being made or delivered until the
courts can decide whether the expression is illegal.4 Once a
type of speech or material or undertaking has been determined
to be unprotected, prior restraint of the particular activity may
occur. All speech, even that which on its face is patently of-
fensive and lewd, falls within the protective sphere of the doc-
trine.43 Governmental authorities, therefore, cannot summari-
ly limit such questionable expression.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1967).
38 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 189, 194 (1983) ("[T]he Court begins with the presumption that
the first amendment protects all communication and then creates areas of
nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech does
not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of the first amendment.").
" The prior restraint doctrine has its origins in the English system of licensed
printers. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). Beginning about the
time of the introduction of the printing press, the British civil and ecclesiastical
governors by law retained the power of prior approval over all printers. Id. These
laws expired in 1695, and thereafter freedom from licensing and prior approval be-
came a recognized right in the common law. Id. For a more comprehensive study
of the English history of press restraint, see FRED S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776 (1952).
40 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990); see Emerson, supra note 2, at
648 (explaining that the doctrine of prior restraint "holds that the First Amend-
ment forbids the Federal Government to impose any system of prior restraint,
with certain limited exceptions, in any area of expression that is within the
boundaries of that Amendment").
41 Emerson, supra note 3, at 648-49.
42 Emerson, supra note 3, at 648-49.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1975).
[Vol. 62:1217
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The impetus behind the doctrine lies in the profound effect
prior restraints can have on speech. Subjecting speech to scru-
tiny can often have "censoring effects," chilling speech before it
is expressed." While all laws regulating speech are to some
extent designed to deter persons from engaging in constitu-
tionally unprotected speech,45 prior restraints are regarded as
a particularly invidious and effective form of restricting
speech.' Of major concern in cases of prior restraint is the
increased prospect for self-censorship." Rather than get them-
selves involved in the regulatory morass associated with ob-
taining a license, individuals may engage in self-censorship to
an extensive and undesirable degree, possibly altering the true
message the speaker intended to convey." The time, effort
"Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint. The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REV. 11, 25 (1981). As Blasi has commented:
Once a communication is disseminated it becomes to some extent a fait
accompli. The world is a slightly different place; perceptions regarding
what is tolerable are altered. Not only can the effects of the speech not
be undone, views regarding the desirability of those effects will be influ-
enced by the common, human tendency to find virtue in the status quo.
Id. at 51.
' See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-36, at 734 (noting that "all regulatory systems
permit some administrative discretion").
"Commentators often attempt to illustrate the chilling effects of prior re-
straints by comparing them with the threat of subsequent punishment. They argue
that while subsequent punishment may act as a deterrent to some actors, at least
the speech may appear in public. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 61; Redish, supra
note 18, at 57. Other authors have focused on the litany of disincentives that
accompany a legislative body's attempt to enact a criminal statute, noting that
Committee deliberation, passage by both houses of the legislature, and the pros-
pect of executive veto all provide obstacles to enacting legislation imposing crim-
inal penalties for speech. See Blasi, supra note 44, at 59-60; see alco BICKEL, su-
pra note 8, at 61. As a result of these institutional differences, "[tihe Court has
indicated a marked preference for the ordinary criminal prosecution as a judicial
vehicle for determination of obscenity." Monaghan, supra note 13, at 543.
' See, eg., Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973) (Justice Powell stating that "[tlhe special vice of a prior restraint is that
communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution
in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the
First Amendment).
"See Blasi, supra note 44, at 25. Blasi goes on to note: "Speakers, listeners,
and society at large all suffer when the peculiar features of a regulatory scheme
have a 'chilling' effect on persons that causes them to forgo protected expression
rather than get themselves enmeshed in the scheme." Blasi, supra note 44, at 24.
Even when a speaker perseveres, one may never know in such a case whether
" the speaker change[d] a few passages in order to placate the censor or expedite
the process of prior approval." Blasi, supra note 44, at 67.
1996] 1225
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and money required to vindicate one's right may also contrib-
ute to an undesirable amount of self-censorship, especially
when contrasted with the ease with which licensing officials
are able to deny permits.49
In addition to censorship concerns, a licensing system's
own bureaucratic dynamics may encourage unwanted or un-
warranted regulation."0 Since licensing officials are often ap-
pointed based on their knowledge and concern over a partic-
ular social interest, they can be expected to perform their du-
ties with a predisposition to regulate speech.51 When they do
so they assume the role not of impartial adjudicator, but that
of expert, "a role which necessarily gives an administrative
agency a narrow and restricted viewpoint."52 Others have ar-
gued that because regulatory agencies are primarily political
bodies, political accountability may encourage officials to regu-
late in response to "momentary public passions or political
preferences that are not widely shared or deeply felt.""3
It is generally agreed that such systemic dangers do not
plague the functioning of a judicial forum. First, courts do not
suffer from the "institutional tunnel vision" inherent in licens-
ing systems. 4 Courts regularly deal with a wide variety of
issues, giving them a broad perspective that no administrative
agency can have.55 Second, judges are protected in large part
from external political pressures by their lifetime tenure.6
This insulation encourages impartial decisionmaking and
" See Blasi, supra note 44, at 46 (noting that permits are denied with little
more than "the stroke of a pen").
W' See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-36, at 734 (noting that the evils of licensing
systems are "to some extent an endemic problem").
51 See Emerson, supra note 3, at 659 (stating that "Itihe function of the censor
is to censor. He has a professional interest in finding things to suppress."); Redish,
supra note 18, at 76-77 (noting that "nonjudicial administrative regulators of ex-
pression exist for the sole purpose of regulating; this is their raison d'etre" and
thus they "will likely feel the obligation to justify their existence by finding some
expression constitutionally subject to regulation").
52 Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523. Monaghan goes on to note that such a re-
stricted viewpoint "is particularly pernicious in the obscenity area; those constantly
exposed to the perverse and the aberrational in literature are quick to find obscen-
ity in all they see." Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523.
' Blasi, supra note 44, at 60; see Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523 (noting
that administrative agencies "are often seen primarily as political organs").
" Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523.
5' Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523.
56 Monaghan, supra note 13, at 522-23.
1226 [Vol. 62: 1217
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makes judges less inclined to be affected by immediate political
passions." In light of these institutional differences, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts alone are
competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protect-
ed.58
A final concern regarding the concept of prior restraint is
the delay caused by licensing and regulatory schemes.'
Courts have recognized that the value of various forms of
speech depends largely on the immediacy of the idea being
expressed." Consequently, any delay in the presentation of
these ideas can detract from the meaning of the particular
speech.6
The Framers of the First Amendment clearly intended to
outlaw prior restraint, and the doctrine has never seriously
been challenged.' In 1931, in Near v. Minnesota, the Su-
preme Court formally endorsed the doctrine and presented it
as a working principle of constitutional law.' The Near case
involved a government attempt to stop further publication of a
newspaper pursuant to state law.' The newspaper had been
found guilty of publishing "malicious, scandalous, and defam-
atory" materials.' 5 The Supreme Court disallowed the injunc-
" Monaghan, supra note 13, at 523; see Emerson, supra note 3, at 658 n.34
("Courts alone are institutionally able consistently to discern, and to apply, the
values embodied in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.").
s' Manual Enter. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); see Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965) (stating that because 'it is the duty of the censor to censor,
there inheres the danger that [a nonjudicial decisionmaker] may well be less re-
sponsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government--to the con-
stitutionally protected interests in free expression).
" Blasi, supra note 44, at 64 (noting that "the process of adjudication can
delay dissemination of the speaker's message to a time when audience interest has
waned or opportunities to act upon the speaker's advice have passed").
Monaghan, supra note 13, at 541.
61 Monaghan, supra note 13, at 541.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTMI OF FREE EXPRESSION 5604 (1970). In fact,
some have argued that the Framers enacted the First Amendment exclusively to
protect against prior restraints. See, eg., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 US. 454, 462
(1907) (Justice Holmes stating that 'the main purpose of [freedom of speech and
freedom of the press] is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications
as had been practiced by other governments').





tion and, through Chief Justice Hughes, stated that the prior
restraint doctrine was subject to limitation "only in exceptional
cases."
66
More importantly, Near established the principle that a
system of prior restraint upon first amendment rights bears a
heavy presumption against its validity. 7 At the core of this
presumption lies a basic principle deeply rooted in American
law: that a free society should punish those few persons who
abuse the rights of free speech only after the abuse rather than
"throttle [the abusers] and all others beforehand. " 68
The first application of the prior restraint doctrine to an
obscenity case occurred in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.69
There the Justices all agreed, contrary to Near, that the prior
restraint doctrine did apply to obscenity cases. The Court dis-
agreed, however, on the construction of the facts and thus left
the situation unresolved. 70 In 1961 the Court, facing the same
issue in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago," held in a five
to four decision that the prior restraint doctrine did not require
"complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any
and every kind of motion picture."72 Justice Clark, writing for
the majority, limited the scope of the decision to its facts, stat-
ing: "[W]e are dealing only with motion pictures and, even as
to them, only in the context of the broadside attack presented
on this record.""3 The four dissenters, led by Chief Justice
Warren, vigorously argued that the ordinance was a prior re-
straint and created a system of licensing and "censorship in its
purest and most far-reaching form."'4
Id. at 716. In his opinion, Chief Justice Hughes noted several "exceptional"
cases where prior restraints may be used: (1) restraints during wartime to prevent
disclosure of military deployments or obstruction of military effort; (2) enforcement
of obscenity laws; and (3) enforcement of laws against incitement to acts of vio-
lence or revolution. Id.
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
70 The case dealt with a complex regulation which was construed by some
justices to be more like a prior restraint, and by others to be more like subse-
quent punishment for commission of a crime.
71 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
72 Id. at 46.
73 Id. at 50.
74 Id. at 55 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court decided another
movie censorship case and revived the prior restraint doctrine
by melding it with notions of procedural due process. In Freed-
man v. Maryland,5 the Court struck down a state movie cen-
sorship statute for lack of procedural safeguards protecting ex-
pression. Justice Brennan noted that "a noncriminal process
which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor
avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of the
censorship system."76 The requirements formulated there and
applied elsewhere include: (1) placing on the censor the burden
of proving that the film is unprotected expression; (2) a proce-
dure requiring the censor to either issue a license or go to
court within a specified brief period; and (3) prompt and final
judicial review of administrative decisions.'
In subsequent applications of the Freedman test, the Court
demonstrated great suspicion for any system of prior restraint.
The Supreme Court has employed Freedman to protect a wide
variety of expression, including: the granting of licenses to
businesses,"8 licenses to put on theatrical performances, 79 li-
censes for marches and demonstrations,.' and licenses to so-
licit at airports."' More, specifically, the Court has differenti-
ated and struck down two types of prior restraint systems:
schemes that allow unbridled discretion on the part of a gov-
ernmental official or agency,' and schemes that fail to limit
the time within which the decision maker must decide whether
"' 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
76 Id. at 58.
7 Id. at 58-60.
" Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
71 Southeastern Promotion Ltd., v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that
an administrative body charged with managing a city auditorium had too much
discretion when it prevented the production of the musical Hair).
' Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding a
statute authorizing the denial of the right to march on Easter Sunday unconstitu-
tional because it gave too much discretion to an administrative official without re-
quiring immediate review by the judiciary).
"' Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982) (holding ordinance seeking to keep the Hare Krishna from soliciting in
the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport unconstitutional).
See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 US. 760
(1988) (holding unconstitutional city ordinance giving mayor unbridled discretion
over whether to grant annual permits for newsracks); Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147
(1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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to issue a license." In both types of prior restraint systems,
strict conformity with the procedural requirements of Freed-
man has been required.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's treatment of the prompt
judicial review requirement after Freedman indicates that the
Court paid heed to Freedman's express requirement of a judi-
cial determination in a timely fashion." In Blount v. Rizzi,"5
for example, the Court struck a Chicago film ordinance that
permitted the General Counsel of the U.S. Postal Service to be-
gin administrative proceedings to withhold mail from any per-
son upon evidence satisfactory to the Postmaster General that
the person was using the mails to distribute obscene matter."
Any person whose mail was withheld could obtain judicial re-
view on the question of the obscenity of the material only after
lengthy administrative proceedings, and "then only by [their]
own initiative."" As the Court saw it, the fatal flaw in this
procedure was that it failed "to require that the Postmaster
General seek to obtain a prompt judicial determination of the
obscenity of the material."'
In 1975, the Court struck down a similar ordinance in
Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad.9 In Southeastern Promo-
tions, an administrative board responsible for managing a city
theater refused to allow the production of the musical Hair on
the grounds that it was "obscene."' The Court struck down
the statute for failing to satisfy the procedural safeguards of
Freedman.9 In particular, the Court held that the board's
See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 (1980) (hold-
ing invalid statute restraining speech for indefinite period).
" In Freedman, the Court stated that "[any restraint imposed in advance of a
final judicial determination on the merits must ... be limited to ... the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution." 380 U.S. at 59. In explain-
ing the need for a judicial determination, the Court quoted from Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958): "[Since] the line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated ... is finely
drawn ... [tihe separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ...
sensitive tools . .. ."
" 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
Id. at 413-14.
87 Id. at 421.
Id. at 418.
89 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
90 Id. at 548.
91 Id. at 562.
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censorship system did not adequately provide for prompt judi-
cial review where a judicial decision on the merits could not be
obtained for five months.'
In United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a federal customs law after
customs agents seized photographs from an individual return-
ing from vacation abroad.' As enacted, the statute did not
contain any of the requisite time limits mandated in Freed-
man, Blount or Southeastern Promotions.' The Court de-
clared the statute facially invalid, and held that for purposes of
examining goods imported into the United States, forfeiture
proceedings must be commenced within fourteen days of sei-
zure of the items." In assessing judicial review, the Court
noted that delays in a 'judicial determination" as long as three
months could not be sanctioned, and thus held that the statute
must provide for a judicial decision within sixty days for it be
constitutionality valid. 7
Thus, in the decisions since Freedman, the Supreme Court
had demanded strict conformity with Freedman's procedural
requirements. In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized the
procedural aspect of the doctrine of prior restraint to be one of
the most important legal impediments to official censorship of
controversial expression." By recognizing the continued via-
bility of the doctrine of prior restraint and applying it consis-
tently, the Court, at least until its decision in FWIPBS, had
indicated its agreement with the principle first articulated in
Near-that expressive materials are presumed to be protected
until it is demonstrated otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
92 Id. at 561-62.
9 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
4Id. at 365-66.
s See 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
Thirty-Seuen Photographs 402 U.S. at 373-74.
'7 Id. at 374.
"See, eg., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (Blaclmaun, J.,
concurring) (noting that the procedural requirements of Freedman are crucial in
the protection they afford minorities against the "standardization of ideas7 by dom-
inant political and minority groups); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971)
(reiterating the value of the Freedman requirements); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-35,
at 733-34 (stating that the problem of excessive administrative discretion is a
problem "most consistently dealt with by demanding strict procedural safeguards




C. FW/PBS v. Dallas
In FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, the Supreme Court once
again addressed the regulation of sexually oriented businesses.
In FWIPBS, three groups brought suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of an ordinance passed by the Dallas City Coun-
cil.99 The ordinance regulated sexually oriented businesses
through a zoning and licensing scheme that was targeted at
reducing the secondary effects of urban blight and criminal
activity.'00 Under the ordinance, businesses could not operate
without obtaining a license.'0 ' In addition, existing business-
es were required to obtain licenses and submit to inspection
when they relocated to a new building, the use of a structure
changed, or the ownership of the business changed.0 2 The
ordinance required the Chief of Police to approve license issu-
ance within thirty days after receipt of the application, 10 3 but
licenses could not be issued without prior approval by health,
fire, and building officials."0 4 The ordinance provided no time
limits for inspections,105 nor did it offer a means of recourse
for applicants whose licenses had not been issued within the
thirty day time period.' 6
Suit was brought in the Northern District of Texas alleg-
ing that the ordinance lacked the requisite procedural safe-
guards mandated by Freedman.°7 The district court upheld
the vast majority of the ordinance, objecting only to the
ordinance's vesting too much discretion in the Chief of Po-
lice.' O8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed,109 concluding that the Freedman safeguards did not
apply because the ordinance, like that in City of Renton v.
" FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
0 Id. at 220.
-01 Id. at 221.
'02 Id. at 227.
103 DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE, ch. 41-A-5(a)(8) (1986) (repealed).
104 Id.
1- FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 218.
106 Id.
" Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex. 1986), affd sub noma.
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), affd in part, reu'd
in part, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
I d.




Playtime Theatres, Inc.,"' regulated only the secondary ef-
fects of sexually oriented businesses."' Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit held that the only relevant question was whether the
regulation was a content-neutral time, place and manner re-
striction."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed." In
a plurality opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court
found that the licensing scheme did not provide adequate pro-
cedural safeguards under the test established in Freedman."4
The plurality concluded, however, that the first prong of the
Freedman test-that the censor bear the burden of proof once
in court-is not required in the context of licensing
schemes." Although Justice O'Connor recognized that the
Court had never before variously applied the Freedman re-
quirements, she noted two distinguishing factors in determin-
ing that the censor need not bear the burden of proof in
FWIPBS. First, the censor in Freedman engaged in direct
censorship of expressive material."6 This type of censorial
action is presumptively invalid because it passes judgment on
the particular content of speech," 7 and thus merits the cen-
sor bearing the burden of proof."8 In contrast, in FW/PBS
the city did not review the content of any particular
speech;" rather, it only examined the applicant's general
qualifications for a license, a "ministerial action that is not
presumptively invalid."20
110 475 U.S. 41 (1986). many ordinances that attempt to regulate adult busi-
nesses do so through zoning. In City of Renton, the Court held that a municipal
zoning ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters from being within 1000 feet of a
residential area, church, park or school did not violate the First Amendment. The
majority stated that the ordinance was aimed at theaters and their secondary
effects, and not at the content of any particular expression or speech. Id. at 5L
m FWIPBS, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988).
112I d.
1 FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
11I d& (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion joined by Stevens and Kennedy, JJ.).
115 Id. at 229-30.
116 Id. at 229.
117 Id.





Second, the plurality noted that the claimant in FW/PBS,
unlike the claimant in Freedman, would have "every incentive"
to pursue a license denial through the courts. 2 1 Because the
financial stake in Freedman was minimal, the Court reasoned
that the distributor lacked any financial incentive to challenge
the legislative authority's decision. 22 Having no incentive to
challenge, the censor's decision resulted in the total suppres-
sion of speech."= In FW/PBS, however, the license applicants
had a strong stake in the outcome since a license was required
to operate a business. Based on the license applicant's
"strong incentive" to challenge the ordinance, the Court rea-
soned that there was little reason to require the licensor to
bear the burden of going to court to effect the license deni-
al.125
Despite dropping the first Freedman requirement, the
plurality reversed on the grounds that the scheme did not limit
restraint prior to judicial review to a "specified brief period"
and it failed to offer an applicant "expeditious judicial review"
of an adverse decision.'26 In discussing the remaining two re-
quirements, the Court noted that while licensing schemes do
not present the same "grave dangers" of direct censorship, a li-
censing scheme creates the possibility that speech will be in-
fringed upon unless there are adequate safeguards ensuring
prompt review. 27 "rhere the licensor has unlimited time
within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary suppres-
sion is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion. 28
121 Id. at 229-30.
1Id.
12 FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 229.
124 Id.
25 Id.
126 Id. at 226-27. Justice O'Connor's decision to drop the requirement that the
censor bear the burden of proof in the context of licensing schemes has drawn
extensive criticism. Most of the criticism centers around the Court's summary
dismissal of the practical obstacles a denied license applicant faces in litigating a
claim, see Grace F. Woods, Constitutional Law: Procedural Safeguards Required in
First Amendment Prior Restraint Context, 42 FLA. L. REV. 399 (1990), and the
perceived negative effect on the principle that a prior restraint bears a heavy
presumption against its validity. See Jordan D. Oelbaum, FW/PBS v. Dallas: The
Severance of the Freedman Rule, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 1119.
227 FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 228.
'28 Id. at 227.
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Accordingly, the Court found the two remaining safe-
guards-requiring a specified brief period of administrative
review and prompt judicial review-to be "essential."'
The plurality failed, however, to offer any further elucida-
tion on the meaning of prompt judicial review other than its
vague directive that "[t]he core policy underlying Freedman is
that the license for a First Amendment-protected business
must be issued within a reasonable -period of time, because
undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of
speech."' Justice O'Connor did, however, mention the
prompt judicial review requirement three times in her opinion.
In each case Justice O'Connor referred to the safeguard as
requiring "the possibility of," or "an avenue for," or "availabili-
ty of' prompt judicial review.' Other than the above express
language, the plurality failed to further define or discuss the
meaning of prompt judicial review."
H. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRcUITs SINCE FW/PBS
The ambiguous language in Justice O'Connor's opinion has
created a split in the circuits over the meaning and scope of
prompt judicial review. The First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have all interpreted FW/PBS to require that a statute provide
only access to judicial review.' The Fourth, Sixth and Elev-
"' Id. at 228.
139 Id.
Id. at 228-30.
13 In a separate concurrence authored by Justice Brennan, three other justices
concluded that all three of the Freedman safeguards applied to invalidate the
scheme. FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 239. Justice Brennan's concurrence alluded to the
variety of contexts in which the Court had previously applied the Freedman safe-
guards, noting that never before had the Court suggested that the Freedman re-
quirements might vary with the particular facts of each prior restraint. Id. Justice
Brennan found the ordinance in FWIPBS indistinguishable from that in Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). FWIPBS, 493 U.S.
at 241. As in FWIPBS, the censor in Riley reviewed the entire business rather
than the particular content of the speech. Id. Yet in Riley, the Court placed the
burden of proof on the censor and not on the license applicant. Id. Yith regard to
prompt judicial review, Brennan's only reference to that requirement was that a
"prompt judicial determination must be available." Id. at 239.
In dissent, Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted the licens-
ing scheme as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, and thus held
that none of the procedural safeguards were needed.
1 See Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Tex., 27 F.3d 1068, 1070 (5th
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enth Circuits, on the other hand, have explicitly rejected any
modification of FWIPBS and maintain that a judicial determi-
nation is necessary to satisfy the requirement.'' A discussion
of these interpretations follows.
A. The First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits' Interpretation of
FW/PBS and Prompt Judicial Review
The First Circuit has determined that providing access to
a judicial proceeding is all that is required by FW/PBS and
Freedman. In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Trans-
portation Authority ("MBTA7), 35 plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of MBTA guidelines prohibiting non-commer-
cial expressive activity in designated areas of some Boston
subway stations and requiring prior authorization to engage in
such activity in other stations.3 ' The district court held the
complete ban on expressive activities and the prior authori-
zation requirements invalid.'37 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit agreed with the district court that the ban on
expressive activity in designated areas was overbroad, but dis-
agreed with the district court's finding regarding the prior au-
thorization requirement.'38 In upholding the latter, the First
Circuit noted that even though the prior restraint in this case
was content neutral, the city regulations must contain the two
post-FWIPBS procedural safeguards;" 9 namely, they must
Cir. 1994); TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir.
1994); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319,
1327 (1st Cir. 1993).
1 See 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988,
999-1000 (4th Cir. 1995); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d
220, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1995).
13 984 F.2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1993).
13 Id. at 1321-22. The conduct prohibited or requiring authorization included
"the following activities for political or non-profit purposes ... : solicitation of
signatures; distribution of printed materials; handshaking or greeting individual
transit patrons or members of the public; or publicly addressing transit patrons at
a noise level greater than 85 decibels." Id. at 1321. The compelling governmental
interest was public safety. Id. at 1322.
I" Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 1500,
1503-04 (D. Mass. 1991).
1 Jews for Jesus, 984 F.2d at 1327.
Id. It is interesting that the Court failed even to acknowledge the prior exis-
tence of the third Freedman requirement, that the censor bear the burden of
proof. The rationale for eliminating that requirement surely does not apply here.
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"limit the time for issuing authorization and... permit prompt
judicial review."' Because the MBTA responded to each
applicant's request at the time it was made, there was no ques-
tion that the regulations satisfied the specified brief period for
issuing a decision requirement.' In interpreting prompt ju-
dicial review, however, the court summarily concluded that be-
cause the regulations provided that an applicant could appeal
a denial of authorization, and that because Massachusetts law
entitled a claimant to a hearing by filing an appeal, the proce-
dural regulations satisfied the prompt judicial review require-
ment.'
Subsequent to the First Circuit's decision in Jews for Je-
sus, the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a simi-
lar ordinance in Tts Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Texas."
In Tls Video, an adult book and video store brought an action
challenging the county's licensing requirements for adult busi-
nesses.' The district court held that the county ordinance
provided adequate procedural safeguards under Freedman and
FW/PBS"4 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed in part because the ordinance authorized officials to
shut down existing businesses pending annual review of their
licenses and thus violated the Freedman mandate that the
regulating agency maintain the status quo pending judicial re-
view.
14
Individuals and groups in subway stations seeking signatures, passing out leaflets
and publicly addressing patrons hardly have the financial stake that would prompt
them to litigate suppression of their activity, thus warranting elimination of the
third requirement. Indeed, the fact that the statute regulates only "noncommercial'
activity suggests that they would have little in the way of incentive to litigate.
Such apparent misapplication of FWIPBS speaks to the uncertainty created by the
Court's varying views on the applicability of the Freedman requirements.
11 Id. The court cited no authority or rationale in concluding that the regula-
tion need only "permit" judicial review other than summarily listing the require-
ments as being "construed" that way in FWIPBS.
141 Id.
142 Id.
1'3 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994).
14 Id. at 707.
1 TIs Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 830 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
1 TK's Video, 24 F.3d at 707-08. The court rejected, however, TK's argument
that the ordinance should provide for an automatic stay pending appeal of an
administrative decision denying an original application for a license. Id. at 703-09.
The court noted that maintaining the status quo means little in that context,
unlike in the case of already existing businesses, because there is "nothing to stay
1996] 1237
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The court upheld, however, the ordinance's provisions
regarding specified brief time periods for issuance and judicial
review.147 In doing so, the court grappled with the question of
whether a "specified, brief period" includes completion of judi-
cial review. Under the statute, a rejected license applicant
could seek judicial review within thirty days before the order
became final. 8 However, there were no provisions for a judi-
cial determination. Despite the "uncertainty in the language of
Justice O'Connor's opinion" and language to the contrary in
Justice Brennan's opinion,' the Fifth Circuit held that
FW/PBS requires only that the state provide an applicant rea-
sonably brief administrative resolution of a claim and access to
the courts within a brief period. 5 ° The court additionally not-
ed that to interpret a brief time period as requiring that all
"judicial avenues [be] exhausted would be an oxymoron."
5'
Accordingly, because the ordinance provided a license applicant
with a prompt judicial hearing in the form of thirty days to
appeal to a district court, the availability of prompt judicial
review satisfied the requirements of FW/PBS and Freed-
man.
52
Following its decision in TKs Video, the Fifth Circuit reaf-
firmed its interpretation of the FW/PBS procedural require-
ments in Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Texas."'
There, the court applied the Freedman requirements to the
revocation of an existing business' license. Despite striking
down portions of a city ordinance for failing to maintain the
status quo,"M the court upheld the ordinance's provisions for
judicial review. 55 As in the TK's Video case, the statute pro-
vided that an applicant could appeal to a district court follow-
except the denial of a license." Id. The court reasoned that this was not "unduly
restrictive [ I given the availability of expeditious judicial review." Id. at 709.
17 Id. at 708. Based on precedent in other jurisdictions, the court found that 60
days was a sufficiently reasonable period of time in which to render an adminis-
trative decision.
'4 Id. at 709.
149 Id.
110 Id.
... Tifs Video, 24 F.3d at 709.
152 Id.
1- 27 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1994).
11 Id. at 1069-70.
115 Id. at 1070-71.
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ing revocation, but the ordinance contained no provision for a
swift judicial decision.5" The court again held that this was
sufficient to satisfy FWIPBS and FreedmanY7 In doing so,
the court noted the discrepancy between Justice Brennan's lan-
guage in Freedman and Justice O'Connor's language in
FWIPBS. While recognizing that in Freedman Justice Brennan
had "stated that a challenged ordinance must guarantee a
specified brief period 'in advance of a final judicial determi-
nation on the merits," the Fifth Circuit argued that Justice
O'Connor "variously recast this standard as a specified brief
period 'prior to judicial review' and as a specified brief period
'prior to the issuance of a license.!"' The court again con-
cluded, based on this language, that FWIPBS compels "only
access to the courts within a specified brief period.""
In Graff v. City of Chicago,""0 the Seventh Circuit ad-
vanced an even more restrictive view of the requirement. In
Graff, a news vendor brought an action challenging the consti-
tutionality of an Illinois ordinance governing the licensing of
city newsstands. 6' Under the statute, within a specified peri-
od after denial of a permit, the aggrieved party could appeal to
the commissioner of transportation." Unlike all of the other
statutes analyzed here, however, the ordinance contained no
provision at all concerning the role of the judiciary in review-
ing a commissioner's denial of a permit. Thus, the fate of the
news vendor's livelihood was left "solely in the hands of the
commissioner of transportation.""
In a sharply divided en banc court, Graff generated a ma-
jority opinion, two concurring opinions and a dissenting opin-
ion. In holding that the procedural safeguards were sufficient
despite the lack of any explicit provision authorizing judicial
review, the majority found the availability of the state's com-
mon law writ of certiorari sufficient to provide an aggrieved
party with an adequate means of judicial review.l" While
16 Id. at 1070.
1'7 Id. at 1071.
15 Grand Brittain, 27 F.3d at 1070.
1Id.
16 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993).
161 Id. at 1311.
162 Id.
16 Id. at 1312.
6 Id. at 1325. The court began its discussion by noting that 'it is not clear
19961
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
recognizing that the Supreme Court in other cases had
"seemed to require an ordinance to provide for judicial review,
even when the writ of common law certiorari was avail-
able,"'65 the court stated that the Supreme Court "has not
been presented directly with the argument that certiorari was
in itself sufficient review.""s Accordingly, the majority felt
why Freedman" requires that a statute explicitly provide for prompt judicial re-
view. Id. at 1324. The court continued:
A person always has a judicial forum when his speech is allegedly in-
fiinged. Neither Graff nor the City argues that the judiciary cannot hear
challenges to this ordinance simply because it does not have a specific
provision designating a review process. The lack of these additional pro-
cedural safeguards does not in any way increase the threat of censorship.
Id. As argued infra notes 166, 232-34 and accompanying text, this view misses the
entire point of providing procedural safeguards in the context of licensing schemes.
The issue is not jurisdictional; rather, it is the length of time government officials
can properly restrain speech during the interim period between a final administra-
tive ruling and the onset (or completion) of review by the judiciary.
I' Graff, 9 F.3d at 1325.
Id. It is worth noting that Illinois law posed a unique problem for the court,
providing it with added incentive to diverge from Supreme Court precedent in this
area. According to the court, under Illinois law municipal officials in "home rule
units" were not authorized to provide for judicial review of administrative agency
decisions. Id. at 1324. In particular, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court of Illinois had rejected municipal attempts to determine the judiciary's juris-
diction to review administrative decisions or to review "the procedure to be fol-
lowed in seeking judicial review of those determinations." Id. (quoting Nowicki v.
Evanston Fair Hous. Review Bd., 338 N.E.2d 186, 187 (1975)). Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the City of Chicago "lacks the separate authority to
make available" prompt judicial review. Id. at 1325. This is a rather spurious
justification for ignoring Supreme Court precedent, however. A municipality's lack
of authority to set forth expedited judicial procedures in no way limits the
judiciary's authority to review the constitutionality of the administrative scheme.
Indeed, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution dictates that such state
law provisions must give way should they come into conflict with constitutional
mandates. See Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U.S. 241, 247 (1967).
In Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 831 F. Supp. 1241 (D. Md.
1993), modified, 58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995), the court reasoned similarly when it
upheld a county ordinance's provision for judicial review despite the lack of any
set time limit for review by the judiciary. In denying relief to the plaintiff, the
court noted that under the Maryland Constitution it did not have the power to
alter the procedures of the state judicial system unless the plaintiff named the
State of Maryland, as opposed to a particular county, as a party to the suit. Id.
at 1251 n.3. Had the plaintiff in that suit properly named the State of Maryland
as a party defendant, the court implied that it might have decided the case differ-
ently because it could then properly address the constitutionality of Maryland's
judicial procedures in this context. Id. In doing so, the Chesapeake B&M court
implicitly recognized the impropriety of the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that it
lacked the authority to address the constitutionality of that state's judicial proce-
dures.
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free to depart from Supreme Court precedent requiring an
explicit provision for prompt judicial review because state
procedural law provided an aggrieved applicant with adequate
means of judicial review through a procedure that the state
"makes... the current common practice."" Accordingly, the
court held the review procedures adequate to protect the inter-
ests of the license applicant."
B. The Fourth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' Interpretation of
FW/PBS and Prompt Judicial Review
In East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the procedural safeguards of FYWIPBS quite
differently." In East Brooks, the court considered the consti-
tutionality of a Memphis ordinance that regulated sexually ori-
ented businesses through a licensing and zoning scheme."'
The statute's only provision for judicial appeal of an adverse
decision was through Tennessee's common law writ of certiora-
ri. 7 ' Although Tennessee law authorized review of adiminis-
trative decisions through the state vehicle of certiorari, the
court found that there was no guarantee of prompt judicial
review because no time limits were placed on the administra-
tive body's compliance with the many state procedural re-
quirements associated with the writ." The court found par-
ticularly troublesome the fact that even if a claimant were to
comply with the procedural requirements, the appeal could not
be heard for at least ninety days, and even that time frame
was not guaranteed.' 3 Thus, the court noted that while,
under state law, this type of appeal takes precedence over
other matters, an applicant could still face a minimum of five
months delay for judicial review. 4 Based on the Supreme
16 Graff, 9 F.3d at 1325.
163 Id.
16 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995).
170 Id. at 222.
171 Id. at 223.
172 Id. at 224-25.
' Id. at 225.
'7' East Brooks Books, 48 F.3d at 225.
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Court's holdings in Southeastern Promotions and FWIPBS, the
court found these potential delays of up to five months to be an
impermissible prior restraint on speech. 7 '
The Eleventh Circuit also interpreted prompt judicial re-
view to require a prompt judicial determination. In Redner v.
Dean,'76 the court considered the constitutionality of a Flori-
da ordinance that regulated adult entertainment establish-
ments. While the case did not directly pose a prior restraint
problem,'77 the court held that the ordinance was facially in-
valid in that it imposed a prior restraint without providing for
adequate time limits on the decisionmaker or prompt judicial
review.'78 In holding the ordinance's provisions for prompt
judicial review constitutionally inadequate, the court noted
that in Southeastern Promotions, a federal district court had
held hearings but ultimately denied the claimant's motion for a
preliminary injunction.'79 The Eleventh Circuit found persua-
sive the fact that the Supreme Court held that the system in
Southeastern Promotions did not provide an adequate means of
judicial review, even though the district court in that case had
actually heard the merits of the action for an injunction within
five months.'80 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that "[tihe Court thus implied that a state's statutory or com-
mon-law mechanisms for review of administrative decisions
does not satisfy the procedural requirements of Freedman."'
81
175 Id.
17 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1697 (1995).
" Unlike all of the other cases discussed in this Note, the claimant in Redner
sought federal habeas corpus relief after he was convicted of violating the Florida
ordinance.
178 Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500-02.
... Id. at 1502 n.9.
180 Id.
..1 Id. In addition, the court in Redner noted the apparent discrepancy between
its analysis and that advanced in Graff. The court avoided, however, criticizing
that decision, instead simply concluding that "our Circuit seems to adhere to the
[judicial determination] school of thought." Id. The court cited and briefly discussed
two other Eleventh Circuit cases in which it had held an ordinance's provisions for
judicial review unconstitutional, but conceded that "[iln neither case [1 did we
directly confront whether Florida's statutory or common-law means of judicial re-
view were adequate procedural safeguards." Id. The court thus missed a golden op-
portunity to articulate its reasons for requiring a prompt judicial determination
and expeditious judicial procedures to effect it.
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The most recent and thorough interpretation of the prompt
judicial review requirement came in the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's
County, Maryland." In 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, the
court struck a county zoning ordinance that regulated adult
bookstores on the ground that it lacked the procedural safe-
guards identified in Freedman and FWIPBS.1" The statute
provided a period of 150 days for a final administrative deci-
sion."' In addition, although the ordinance itself failed to
provide for judicial review, an administrative law judge for the
Circuit Court of Prince County issued an administrative order
requiring a limited form of judicial review. The order provided
that each case be assigned to a specific judge who would hear
oral argument within five days after the date for filing a reply
memorandum under Maryland Rules, and required the judge
to render a decision within five days after the conclusion of
oral argument."
Based on the administrative order, the County asserted
that prompt judicial review was available to the aggrieved
party because an applicant denied a license could seek judicial
review of the denial of an application immediately after an
administrative decision was rendered." According to the
County, based on Justice O'Connor's express language in
FWIPBS, this was all that the Supreme Court's decision in
FWIPBS required." 7
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however,
reversed, holding that the ordinance failed to satisfy the consti-
tutionally mandated safeguards of FW/PBS." In addition to
1- 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1995).
183 Id.
14 Id. at 992.
18 Id. at 992-93.
18 Id. at 998.
7 11126 Baltimore Blvd., 58 F.3d at 998.
18 Id at 1000. As an initial matter, the court concluded that, based on the pre-
cedent of other jurisdictions, 150 days was not the shortest time period in which
an administrative decision reasonably could be completed. Id. at 1001.
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determining that the date from application to judicial resolu-
tion was not a "specified brief period,"'89 the court discussed
in detail the ordinance's provisions for judicial review.
Initially, the court noted that under Maryland law 110
days would typically be required to obtain a judicial ruling
after a final administrative denial. 9 ' When adding that peri-
od to the potential 150-day period for rendering a final admin-
istrative decision, an applicant could face up to an eight and
one-half month delay before being granted a license.'91 Thus,
the court concluded that because the ordinance itself failed to
provide any explicit means of judicial review and Maryland
procedures only provided for a three and one-half month time
period to reach a judicial decision, the ordinance failed to pro-
vide for a prompt judicial determination on the merits.9"
In addition, the court addressed in detail the county's
argument that FWIPBS's plurality opinion modified
Freedman's prompt judicial review requirement.'93  The
Fourth Circuit rejected the county's argument outright. First,
the court noted that, other than Justice O'Connor's language
asserting that a statute must provide for the "possibility of," or
the provision of "an avenue for," prompt judicial review, she
made no explicit or, for that matter, implicit allusions to modi-
fying the requirement."94 Second, the court noted that the Su-
preme Court, in applying the prompt judicial review require-
ment since Freedman, has used the phrases "prompt judicial
review" and "prompt judicial decision" interchangeably.'
Given this, the court reasoned that it was unreasonable to con-
strue Justice O'Connor's statements that there must be "an
avenue for" or "the possibility of prompt judicial review to
mean that mere access to a judicial forum satisfies Freed-
man."'96 Finally, the court noted that while the licensing
scheme in FWIPBS did not explicitly provide for judicial re-
" Id. at 997-98. The court compared the Maryland ordinance's 150-day time
limit for completing administrative review to the time limitations imposed in other
jurisdictions.
1" Id. at 998.
9 Id.
1 11126 Baltimore Blvd., 58 F.3d at 1001.
193 Id. at 998-1000.
194 Id. at 999.
" Id. at 999-1000.
196 Id. at 1000.
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view, judicial review in the form of an appeal to the judiciary
was available under Texas law.' Yet, despite the possibility
that immediate judicial review was available, the Court in
FWIPBS concluded that there was no "avenue for prompt judi-
cial review.""9  The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that
FWIPBS cannot be read to relax the prompt judicial review of
Freedman, and accordingly held the statute to be an invalid
prior restraint on speech.'
IF[. ANALYSIS
Based on the express language of Justice O'Connor's plu-
rality opinion, the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have all
interpreted prompt judicial review to require only that admin-
157 11126 Baltimore Blud., 58 F.3d at 1000.
*'Id.
Id. at 1001-02. In a partial dissent, Judge Niemeyer concluded that, based
on Justice O'Connor's "express language in FWIPBS, an ordinance incorporating a
licensing scheme need only provide access to prompt judicial review. Id. at 1003.
In addition, Judge Niemeyer stated that the majority misinterpreted the "essence
of the safeguard" by requiring the rendering of a judicial decision to satisfy the re-
quirement. Id. at 1004. "The essence of the safeguard is the review and not the
result .... Since there are no external checks on the judiciary's review, the scope
of the safeguard of necessity ends with access to the judicial branch.' Id. Despite
satisfying the prompt judicial review requirement, Judge Niemeyer concurred in
the judgment on the ground that the county ordinance failed to limit its adminis-
trative decision to a specified brief period. Id. at 1002.
It is worth noting that the remaining circuits have yet to adopt a definitive
interpretation of prompt judicial review. In the Second Circuit, recent case law dis-
cussing the issue is sparse. Older district court cases suggest the need for a judi-
cial determination in certain types of obscenity cases. In United States v. One
Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled '491, 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1966), a district court ad-
dressed the adequacy of a federal seizure statutes provision for judicial review.
The case spoke approvingly of other cases where the ordinance explicitly provided
for a judicial determination, and noted Freedman'e citation to Kingsley Boo hS v.
Brown, which required a judicial determination to be made within two days of
trial Id. at 459 (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 US. 436 (1957)). In
addition, the court noted that the Supreme Court has 'commented unfavorably as
to the fact that in [Freedman] the decision on appeal as to the issue of obscenity
took six months," and that in Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717
(1961), the Court "spoke disapprovingly of the fact that in that case over two
months had elapsed between the seizure and judicial decision." One Carton, 247 F.
Supp. at 459. Despite the problems associated with the judicial review procedures,
however, the court refused to hold that a delay of eight to ten weeks in reaching
a judicial decision denied the claimant prompt judicial review 'in the absence of
authoritative pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 462.
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istrative officials provide applicants facing license denials
prompt access to a judicial forum."' This interpretation, how-
ever, fundamentally misapprehends the nature and policies un-
derlying the Freedman safeguards. In addition, Supreme Court
precedent in this area strongly dictates against such a reading.
Accordingly, the only effective means of avoiding the wrongful
suppression of speech in the context of licensing schemes is to
require a statutorily imposed judicial determination on the
merits.
At the outset, it should be noted that there is little doubt
that the Freedman Court construed prompt judicial review as
requiring a judicial determination. While the Supreme Court
has yet to define explicitly prompt judicial review, the lan-
guage of Freedman illustrates that the Court envisioned more
than mere access to a judicial forum:
[B]ecause only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding
ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a
valid final restraint .... Any restraint imposed in advance of a final
judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compati-
ble with sound judicial resolution.... [Tihe procedure must... as-
sure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect
of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.2 °'
The cases upon which Freedman relied, particularly
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,"2 also suggest that the propri-
ety of any prior restraint should depend on the applicant's
having received a timely adversary hearing. The Court spoke
kindly of the procedure in Kingsley, noting that it "postpone[d]
any restraint against sale until a judicial determination of
obscenity following notice and an adversary hearing."20 3 In
other cases involving analogous situations,20' the Supreme
20 See supra notes 133-168 and accompanying text.
201 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
212 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
2'2 Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60. The statute provided for a hearing one day after
joinder of issue; the judge was required to enter a decision within two days after
termination of the hearing. Id.
204 The first manifestation of the Court's concern over the availability and type
of judicial relief needed to impose a valid prior restraint came in cases involving
procedures permitting ex parte seizure of materials. In Marcus v. Search Warrant
of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the Court invalidated a Missouri procedure
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Court's preoccupation with the type of judicial proceeding a
prospective applicant must receive also suggests that some
type of determination on the merits is necessary before re-
straint can occur. 5
The Supreme Court's discussion and application of prompt
judicial review after Freedman also suggests that a judicial
determination is needed to satisfy the requirement. The Su-
preme Court's decisions in Southeastern Promotions, Blount
and Teital all found ordinance provisions invalid for failure to
provide a prompt judicial "determination" of obscenity." In
addition, in a footnote to the Court's opinion in Interstate Cir-
cuit v. City of Dallas,0' the Court explicitly contemplated a
procedure's provision for judicial review. The Court rejected
the appellant's claim that Freedman requires a procedure pro-
viding for swift appellate review, but did so on the grounds
that "the assurance of a 'prompt final judicial decision! is made
here, we think, by the guaranty of a speedy determination by
the trial court."" Although the Court did not explain exactly
which allowed police officers to seize materials using a vague, ex parte search
warrant. The Court struck the procedure because it left too much discretion in the
arresting officers. Likewise, in Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964),
the Court held that a procedure permitting the seizure of books prior to an adver-
sary hearing was an impermissible intrusion upon free expression. Although both
cases involved ex parte seizure procedures, there is little reason to distinguish ex
parte seizures of materials from ex parte restraints against speech; both should
require "a prior adversary hearing." Monaghan, supra note 13, at 533 (noting that
"[ex parte seizures are closely akin to ex parte restraints against speech").
I In the early seizure cases, the Court articulated its reasons for requiring a
judicial determination on the merits. In Quantity of Books, the Court noted that
an adversarial hearing on the merits is important because it can direct the judge
to the relevant legal considerations. 378 U.S. at 210-11; see Marcus, 367 U.S. 717
(1961). In addition, adversary hearings help ensure that any injunctive order will
"be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case." Carroll v.
President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968). The Court's
citation to some of these cases in Freedman strongly suggests that they had simi-
lar concerns in cases involving ex parte restraints against speech.
' Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (in outlin-
ing the Freedman requirements, the Court stated Oa prompt final judicial determi-
nation must be assured"); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (defining
prompt judicial review as "a final determination on the merits within a specified,
brief period"); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (striking a Chicago
ordinance because it 'failed to require that [the legislative authority) obtain a
prompt judicial determination of the obscenity of the material").
1" 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968).
Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965)). The Maryland
procedure in question required a judicial determination within nine days of the
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what type of judicial proceeding is required to satisfy Freed-
man, the fact that the determination had to be "speedy" dem-
onstrates that the Court intended to incorporate the period of
judicial review into the requirement.
But perhaps the best indication of the Court's post-Freed-
man understanding of prompt judicial review came in United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs. There, the Court explicitly
held that it is within the judiciary's power and discretion to
determine the "speed with which prosecutorial and judicial
institutions can, as a practical matter, be expected to function
.... )209 That holding paved the way for the Court to address
its primary concern-which was not the adequacy of the feder-
al statute's provision for access to judicial review21 -- but
rather the length of time in which judicial proceedings had to
be completed.2" Since judicial proceedings might not be com-
pleted for up to seven months,21 2 the Court held that the
final administrative action.
209 United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 372 (1971).
2 0 Underlying the controversy in the circuits over the meaning of prompt judi-
cial review are the circuit courts' varying views on the judiciary's authority to
determine the adequacy of its own judicial procedures. As is the case with the
U.S. Constitution, each state constitution mandates that this determination is a
legislative prerogative. See Monaghan, supra note 13, at 547 (noting that "Itihero
is considerable support for the view that both Congress and the states possess
wide discretion in shaping their own remedial systems"). However, Thirty-Seven
Photographs suggests that the judiciary does have some power to alter judicial
procedures as long as it is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute.
See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-27, at 717. If the federal courts do have the inher-
ent authority to determine the adequacy of their own procedures, as Thirty-Seven
Photographs suggests, the circuit courts' reliance on this argument as a justifica-
tion for not requiring a judicial determination is ill-founded. Moreover, even in a
case where the judiciary lacks authority to take remedial action, this in no way
limits its authority to review the constitutionality of a proposed scheme. See infra
note 234 and accompanying text.
The issue becomes relevant because the question posed in Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs and the circuit court cases, see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text,
is slightly different from that considered in Freedman. In Freedman and the sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases considering prompt judicial review, the question
posed to the Court concerned the adequacy of the time period for the onset of
judicial review, without explicitly addressing the adequacy of judicial means and
time periods by which a decision on the merits -must be reached. The Supreme
Court's decision in Thirty-Seven Photographs, however, strongly suggests that the
Court intended the period of judicial review to be included in the mix when con-
sidering the adequacy of a particular statutory provision.
211 Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 371-72.
212 Id. at 372. The Court cited three district court cases in which judicial pro-
ceedings took anywhere from three to seven months. Id.
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statute's provision for judicial review was inadequate and set
forth a specific time limit of sixty days in which a judicial
determination on the merits must be rendered. In doing so, the
Court emphasized that the possibility of lengthy judicial pro-
ceedings "was clearly inconsistent with the concern for prompt-
ness... frequently articulated."m
Thus, following Supreme Court precedent in the area, the
only means by which a court might find that mere access to
judicial review is sufficient is to construe Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion as authorizing it. The Fifth Circuit, while
recognizing that the Freedman Court required a "final determi-
nation," argues that the express language of Justice O'Connor's
opinion in FWIPBS indicates that she "variously recast this
standard as a specified brief period 'prior to judicial
review."'214 The First Circuit makes a similar argument, stat-
ing that Justice O'Connor "construed" the prompt judicial re-
view requirement as requiring only access to the judiciary
within a specified, brief period.1 The Seventh Circuit, al-
though not specifically relying on Justice O'Connor's express
language in FWIPBS, implicitly makes the same argument by
21 Id. In addition to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue, it is
worth noting that district courts of the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits, each of
which now subscribes to the mere access view, had at one time interpreted prompt
judicial review as requiring a judicial decision and, where necessary, expedited
procedures to effect it. See, e.g., Progressive Labor Party v. Lloyd, 487 F. Supp.
1054, 1056-57 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting that the procedural mechanism in cases of
state censorship requires an expedited judicial procedure "like that in Frcdman,"
but refusing to apply the "strict" Freedman interpretation of the requirement on
the grounds that the censoring action was 'ministerial" in nature and the ordi-
nance was predominantly facially neutral); Universal Film Exchnges, Inc. v. City
of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286, 290 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (holding constitutional a movie
censorship ordinance which provided for a final judicial determination within eight
days after an administrative decision had been rendered, exclusive of actual trial
time, but refusing to strike the statute for failure to provide for expedited appel-
late court procedures because [t]he assurance of a 'prompt final judicial decision'
. . . is made here, we think, by the guarantee of a speedy determination by the
trial court"); Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906, 911 (N). Tex.
1965) ("There being no provision in the Texas statutes for prompt judicial review
in the trial and appellate courts, and experience being that risk of delay is built
into the Texas procedure, the foirdinance in question lacks sufficient procedural
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.").
21 Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Te, 27 F.3d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.
1994).
25 Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319,
1327 (1st Cir. 1993).
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recognizing that its decision departs from "other Supreme
Court cases [which] seemed to require an ordinance provide for
,1216judicial review.
As an initial matter, it is not altogether clear that the
express language of FW/PBS indicates that access to a judicial
forum is adequate to satisfy the prompt judicial review re-
quirement. Justice O'Connor's statements requiring legislative
authorities to provide "an avenue for prompt judicial review"
could just as easily be construed to mean that they must pro-
vide an avenue for a "prompt judicial determination." Indeed,
as the Fourth Circuit noted in 11126 Baltimore Boulevard,
when applying the safeguard the Supreme Court has often
used the phrase "prompt judicial review" interchangeably with
the phrase "prompt judicial decision."217 Considering the Su-
preme Court's synonymous usage of the terms in past deci-
sions, the circuit court's reliance on the "express language" of
FW/PBS as a basis for modification appears dubious at
best.
218
Justice O'Connor's more general articulation of the prin-
ciples underlying the Freedman requirements also suggests
that she had no intention of relaxing the prompt judicial re-
21' Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1993). In addition, the
dissent in 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d
998, 1002-04 (4th Cir. 1995), relies on Justice O'Connor's language in FWIPBS as
justification for concluding that prompt judicial review does not require a judicial
determination.
217 See 11126 Baltimore Blvd., 58 F.2d at 999-1000 (noting that "other decisions
prior to Justice O'Connor's in FWIPBS, including Freedman, used the phrase
'prompt judicial review' to mean a prompt judicial determination"); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1975) (holding that the board's
licensing system "did not provide a procedure for prompt judicial review" where a
"judicial decision on the merits" was not obtained for five months); Blount v. Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (stating that Freedman requires that the statute provide
for "prompt judicial review'-a final judicial determination on the merits within a
specified,* brief period"); see also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 367-70 (1971) (using the phrase "prompt judicial review" interchangeably
with the phrase "prompt judicial decision").
218 Of course, this argument cuts both ways. Synonymous usage of the terms in
past decisions undermines any claim that the Court's earlier mention of the
phrase "prompt judicial determination" in and of itself establishes that the Court
intended to incorporate the period of judicial review into the Freedman require-
ment. Regardless, the Court's explicit holding in Interstate Circuit v. City of Dal-
las, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), and the reasoning of Thirty-Seven Photographs suggest




view requirement. First, in dropping the first Freedman re-
quirement, Justice O'Connor stated that the remaining two
Freedman requirements-that an ordinance provide for a swift
administrative decision and that it provide for prompt judicial
review-are "essential."219 Justice O'Connor reaffirmation of
the necessity of prompt judicial review and subsequent citation
to Freedman strongly suggests that she adopted Freedman's in-
terpretation of the safeguard, and it is unmistakable that the
Court required a "final determination on the merits.'
Second, in discussing the unique dangers licensing
schemes pose to protected speech, Justice O'Connor stated that
the failure of a licensing scheme "to provide for definite limita-
tions on the time within which the licensor must issue the
license" renders it invalid because it "contains the same vice as
a statute delegating excessive administrative discretion.m "
In most cases, however, a license will not "issue" until a final
determination is rendered.' During the interim period be-
tween the onset of judicial review and final determination,
therefore, the applicant's speech is still suppressed. Thus, pro-
viding mere access to judicial review prior to a judicial deter-
mination does nothing to alleviate the wrongful suppression of
speech. The only logical corollary to Justice O'Connor's state-
ment, therefore, is that protected speech will only be vindi-
cated upon issuance of a license, which in turn can only be en-
sured through a judicial determination that it is or is not ob-
scene.
Moreover, the deficiencies in providing access to judicial
review become apparent when considering the prompt judicial
review requirement in conjunction with the second Freedman
requirement-that the state provide a final administrative
"1, FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990).
' Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965): see supra notes 200-204
and accompanying text.
"' FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 226-27.
Under all the ordinances considered in this Note, a prospective licensee is
denied a license to operate pending a judicial determination. While both Freedman
and FWIPBS require that the administering body preserve the status quo pending
judicial resolution of the claim, this offers an applicant who is maling an initial
application for a license no relief because there is nothing to stay except the deni-
al of the license itselfE Obviously, granting a stay pending a judicial decision can
be an effective means of protecting first amendment interests in cases involving
license renewals for existing businesses.
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decision within a reasonably brief period. In determining the
reasonableness of the time period for administrative review,
the circuit courts in all of the above mentioned cases compared
the time requirements of the ordinance in question with those
in other jurisdictions.2' However, it makes little sense to use
a comparative approach to determine the reasonableness of the
time period for rendering administrative decisions if the time
periods for and procedures associated with judicial review vary
from state to state. For example, in 11126 Baltimore Boule-
vard, the court noted that under Maryland procedures it usual-
ly takes three and one-half months for a judicial decision to be
rendered following the onset of the case 4.2 1 In Thirty-Seven
Photographs, however, the Court noted other jurisdictions in
which judicial proceedings might not be completed for up to
seven months.2 It is quite possible, using the comparative
approach, that an ordinance providing for a greater time period
for rendering an administrative decision, say ninety days, but
a quicker judicial procedure, say forty-five days, could be found
unconstitutional despite the fact that the total time period
during which speech is suppressed is far less than say, an
ordinance providing for a forty-five day administrative review
period but judicial proceedings are not completed for several
months.
Thus, the fallacy that access rather than a determination
is sufficient to protect first amendment interests is exposed
when considering the two requirements together. Indeed, Jus-
tice O'Connor seemed to recognize that the time requirements
for administrative decision and judicial review are really two
sides of the same coin when she stated that "[tihe core policy
underlying Freedman is that the license for a First
Amendment-protected business must be issued within a rea-
sonable period of time, because undue delay results in the
unconstitutional suppression of protected speech.""6
22 See, e.g., 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 32 F.3d
109 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that 150 days was not a reasonably brief period with-
in which to render an administrative decision, based on precedent in other juris-
dictions upholding statutory provisions requiring that administrative review be
completed in time frames varying from 44 to 90 days).
221 Id. at 113.
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 372 (1971).
22 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990). Other commenta-
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Thus, while policy and Supreme Court precedent indicate
that a judicial decision should be the preferred course, this
does not end the matter. The question remains: To what extent
must the judicial process be completed before the time period
becomes unreasonable? Must an ordinance provide for comple-
tion of review at both the trial and appellate levels, or is an
initial judicial determination sufficient? Indeed, as the First
Circuit noted, to require that "all judicial avenues be exhaust-
ed would be an oxymoron,"m  and may be inconsistent with
Freedman's suggestion that review be provided in a manner
"compatible with sound judicial resolution."'
What the teachings of Freedman and the Supreme Court's
subsequent jurisprudence do make clear is that judicial review
is best accomplished through a judicial determination on the
merits.' At a minimum, such review would require an evi-
dentiary proceeding, with the protections of counsel, confronta-
tion and cross-examination."0 In this sense, the use of the
extraordinary writs as a means of providing a determination
tors have stated the core policy of Freedman somewhat differently, but with the
same import. See Monaghan, supra note 13, at 532 (noting that the requirement of
judicial review seems in part "predicated on the belief that delay in the availabili-
ty of judicial relief differs only in degree, and sometimes not at all, from the com-
plete absence of judicial review"); Redish, supra note 18, at 77-78 (arguing that
"nonjudicial restraint of expression prior to ultimate judicial review is the only
form of judicial restraint appropriately subjected to a special negative presumption.
This is true even if the nonjudicial restraint is imposed merely on an interim
basis pending ultimate judicial resolution. During that time period a prima facie
abridgement of speech is taking place.").
TICs Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Teax., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994).
22 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965).
22 See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding
that injunctive procedures that base their holdings on a finding of probable cause
of obscenity do not amount to a judicial determination on the merits). At least at
one time there appears to have been general agreement that Freedman requires
an adversarial hearing before a competent judicial tribunal, and that the standard
to be employed should be that employed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); see, e.g., Clark v. City of Freemont, Neb., 377 F. Supp. 327, 341 (D. Neb.
1974).
228 Indeed, this type of adversary hearing may be necessary in order to preserve
an appeal. See Douglas Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence Or-
ders, 52 N.C. L. REV. 127, 132-33 (1982) (noting that in a case where "the merits
of a case are decided or substantial rights [are] affected, orders are generally ap-




on the merits is plainly inappropriate. Although they may have
the advantage of speed, they are discretionary in character and
lack an orderly procedure."m '
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, any licensing
system must contain time restricted processes and explicit
provisions making access to a judicial decision available.232 In
the absence of available administrative initiatives, state legis-
latures may very well need to take action to remedy deficient
judicial review procedures in cases of prior restraint.233 While
this might be the more cumbersome option, the Supreme Court
has long held that to the extent that procedures affect constitu-
23 See generally Rendleman, supra note 230, at 135-38. Rendleman goes on to
conclude that the writs are an inappropriate means of deciding first amendment
cases because they involve "matters of judgment and discretion [that] are frequent-
ly concealed by a fog of arcane doctrine and archaic over-conceptualism."
Rendleman, supra note 230, at 137.
'2 Most jurisdictions do not prevent a municipality from specifying an expedited
procedure or from petitioning the state legislature for a minor change in the law.
As the court noted in 11126 Baltimore Blvd., state and city officials can always
impose on themselves "more limited time restraints for filing the administrative
record and responsive pleadings and memoranda than those provided under [state]
procedure." 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 32 F.3d
109 (4th Cir. 1994).
' Indeed, several states have adopted special procedural rules for use in first
amendment cases. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide: "When a
preliminary or special injunction freedom of expression is issued, either without
notice or after notice and hearing, the court shall hold a final hearing within
three (3) days after demand by the defendant. A final decision shall be filed ...
within twenty-four (24) hours after the close of the hearing." PA. R. CIV. P.
1531(f)(1). An explanatory note states that the three-day period is a maximum and
that "in particular cases, a shorter period may be required." For application of the
Pennsylvania safeguards, see Grove Press v. 807 Liberty Ave., 288 A.2d 750 (Pa.
1972); Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 248 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1968).
Texas also at one time had special procedures for dealing with obscenity cas-
es, which set forth not only time limits but also required the impaneling of three
judges at hearings. See Texas Penal Code of 1925, art. 527, § 13 (repealed 1973).
As part of the Fifth Circuit, both the Texas courts and the legislature at least at
one time recognized the inadequacy of Texas procedures for dealing with obscenity
cases. See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 172 (5th Cir.
1978) (noting that Texas judicial procedure as it existed at the time failed "to
treat obscenity with the kid gloves the [Flirst [Almendment requires"); see also In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906, 911 (N.D. Tex. 1965)
(holding that because "delay is built into the procedure" of the Texas courts at
both the trial and appellate levels, the Texas statute lacked the procedural safe-
guards "designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system").
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tional rights, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
demands that state and local procedure give way to first
amendment concerns.'
While some form of a judicial determination on the merits
is essential at the trial level, what is less clear is whether
prompt judicial review should be construed to encompass any
period of appellate review.' Indeed, it may be a mistake to
conclude that the First Amendment is always safe in the
hands of the trial courts. There is always the possibility that a
trial court will misinterpret or misapply it,' and there are
even occasions where the courts can violate it.' Considering
the possibility of error at trial, compounded by the fact that
the normal stages of the appellate process-notice, briefing,
submission and decision-frequently take several monthsP
it could be argued that a period of additional intensive judicial
review at the appellate level should be included in any defi-
nition of prompt judicial review."
' See Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (noting that the federal
courts are the "primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by
the Constitution); TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-30, at 724 ("In dose cases, govern-
ment must leave speech ample room to breathe. How best to do that is properly
left to the majoritarian branches; when it must be done is a judgment properly
enforced by the judiciary.") (emphasis added).
Rendleman, supra note 230, at 134-35 (noting that expeditious appellate
review could be provided for in several ways, including by accelerated appeal as
provided by appellate rule, suspending the rules, or by motion to stay or suspend
an order or injunction).
" See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUL. L. REV. 229,
269 (1985) (noting that some commentators believe that the first amendment pro-
cedural rules "are simply too indeterminate to be left for application by a trier of
fact, even an article I district judge").
Injunctions and ex parte judicial orders are prime examples. See, eg., Vance
v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (reversing a trial court's iqjunc-
tion because the court employed an improper standard of review); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (invalidating a judicially imposed prior
restraint); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 US. 307 (1967) (reversing a convic-
tion in state court for contempt for violating an ex parte order against holding a
demonstration because the court failed to consider the litigant's claim that the
order was unconstitutional).
' Rendleman, supra note 230, at 134; see Monaghan, supra note 13, at 534
n.61 (noting the inherent delays associated with the appellate process).
' Several commentators have argued that the appellate process should be
included in assessing the promptness of review. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note
13, at 534 n.61 (stating that while the "dangers to first amendment interests
posed by interim [restraints] are substantially reduced when quick decisions on the
merits are forthcoming," they are 'by no means eliminated [ I because the appeal
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But to include the period of appellate review in the prompt
judicial review requirement may be unwarranted and, in any
event, unlikely to occur in light of Supreme Court precedent.
First, the requirement of a prior adversary hearing does much
to mitigate the erroneous administrative denial of a permit.
While the applicant's right to free expression would still be
denied in the interim, at least an impartial and politically
insulated judge, rather than a politically appointed licensing
official, has made the decision.24 Second, despite arguments
to the contrary, there is little evidence to suggest that trial
judges wrongly decide first amendment cases to an "intolera-
ble" degree."4 Finally, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme
Court would conclude that provisions for an expedited appel-
late procedure are necessary under FW/PBS when in their
earlier holding in Interstate Circuit, the Court explicitly held
that prompt judicial review does not require anything beyond a
speedy determination by the trial court.242 Other Supreme
Court holdings also counsel against a rule requiring review
beyond the trial stage.4 Thus, even if an expedited appellate
process is necessarily time consuming. Accordingly, an expedited appeal process is
also necessary if restraint is sought during the appeal."); Redish, supra note 18, at
89 (arguing that an opportunity for an appeal may be "advisable because the op-
portunity for appellate review is important to the fairness of the judicial process
and may do much to preserve the legitimacy of that process in the eyes of liti-
gants"); see also National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44
(1977) (holding in a brief per curiam opinion that injunctions against speech must
be stayed if they are not subject to expeditious appellate review, and citing Freed-
man, perhaps suggesting that the Court now reads Freedman to require expedi-
tious appellate review). But see Blasi, supra note 44, at 31 (arguing that Freed-
man does not require an expedited appellate process despite the fact that ag-
grieved applicants "can face indefinite delays").
240 See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
24' "Neither the empirical nor the normative reference points for [the argument
that trial courts wrongly decide an intolerable number of first amendment cases)
are obvious . . . . It is a long way from accepting this set of propositions to a
conclusion that we will end up with an 'intolerable' degree of chilling effect unless
all appellate courts are required to redetermine every instance of first amendment
law application." Rendleman, supra note 230, at 268-69.
242 Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 n.22 (1968). Moreover,
the Court's pronouncement on the issue of judicial review is more than mere dicta.
The Court's interpretation of prompt judicial review came in direct response to the
appellants assertion that the city ordinance in that case violated Freedman "be-
cause it [did] not secure prompt state appellate review." Id. The Court's notation
should, therefore, have precedential effect.
2' See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (concluding that the right
to appeal to an appellate court is not of constitutional significance); Poulos v. New
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procedure were advisable, it is unlikely the Court would in-
clude it as part of a prompt judicial determination on the mer-
its.
It could be argued that all of this concern over timing and
procedures is a waste of judicial resources and that, in most
cases, the actual timing of communication will be of little con-
sequence to the speaker. Indeed, absent an attempt by the
speaker to express views about a current political or social
event, one could reasonably conclude that the relatively limited
time restraints involved amount only to a de minimus restric-
tion on the right to freedom of expression.'
Such a conclusion would be inappropriate, however, for
two reasons. First, it is an unfortunate fact of life in the mod-
ern court system that it may take years, and cost a plaintiff a
great deal of money, before his or her complaint receives a
hearing on the merits. Given current docket delays and the ex-
tensive time period needed to conduct a full adversarial hear-
ing on the merits, the time restraints can hardly be charac-
terized as de minimus. Rather, it would seem that forcing a
purveyor of first amendment materials to wait months, if not
years, for a court to pass judgement on his or her case is
anathema to prior restraint law.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, such a view under-
mines the values served by the prior restraint doctrine and
strikes at the heart of core first amendment values. It has long
been recognized that the protective sphere of the First Amend-
ment extends beyond the content of the speaker's state-
ment .' The time, place and manner of an individual's ex-
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). In Poulos, an aggrieved applicant for a permit
noted that long delays, possibly lasting years, would be required before his rights
could be fully adjudicated. The Court dismissed this concern, stating that "[dlelay
is unfortunate, but the expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens
must pay for life in an orderly society where the rights of the First Amendment
have a real and abiding meaning." Id. at 409. In concurrence, Justice Frankfurter,
possibly as a precursor to the Court's later decision in Freedman, limited his
agreement with the above statement to cases where prompt judicial review is
available to minimize the wrongful denial of a permit. Id. at 420.
2" See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-33, at 730-31 (arguing that, in most
cases, concerns regarding the timing of speech are simply not relevant in the
context of licensing schemes); Blasi, supra note 44, at 30-33 (making a similar
argument).
2I See generally City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 US. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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pression are themselves an integral part of expression and
thus remain inevitably intertwined with the exercise of first
amendment rights. The matter of an individual's chosen tim-
ing, therefore, implicates not only questions of procedural due
process, but extends beyond notions of due process to affect the
substantive character of an individual's right to free ex-
pression. While practical realities demand that individuals
cannot in all cases retain complete control over the timing and
manner of their expression, courts must remain vigilant in pre-
serving those aspects of first amendment rights.
Despite these considerations, courts since FW/PBS contin-
ue to express confusion as to exactly what Freedman and
FW/PBS require." In this sense, Supreme Court definition
of prompt judicial review is crucial. Without it, federal district
and appellate courts will continue to apply the judicial review
requirement in a haphazard manner. The Seventh Circuit's
resolution of this issue is an excellent example of the confusion
the Supreme Court's silence has created, and represents per-
haps the furthest departure from the safeguards set forth in
Freedman. Not only does the Seventh Circuit miss the boat in
failing to insist upon a judicial determination, but it has not
even ensured prompt access to judicial review." To suggest
26 See, e.g., Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1333 (conceding that the
Court's opinion in FWIPBS "is the source of our difficulty").
247 While the Freedman Court was unclear as to exactly what type of judicial
review was required, in later cases the Court made clear that the statute, regula-
tion or ordinance itself must explicitly provide for prompt judicial review. See, e.g.,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1975). Only the
Graff decision is at odds with this specific mandate. The Redner case provided an
excellent example of why the Supreme Court requires that an ordinance explicitly
provide the means by which an applicant could seek judicial review. There the dis-
trict attorney argued that the statute should not be declared facially invalid based
on its judicial appellate process because the claimant could simply "forgo the ap-
pellate process provided by the statute and proceed immediately to Florida state
court via Florida's common-law writ of certiorari." Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495,
1502 (11th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument on two grounds:
First, the court noted that an applicant in such a case runs the risk of dismissal
for failing to exhaust administrative remedies because, as is the case in most
jurisdictions, "exhaustion is a question of judicial policy, not jurisdiction." Second,
the court noted the inherent unfairness of such a procedure, stating
we find it repugnant to the principle of due process that a county ordi-
nance could set such a trap for the unwary applicant. To hold that an
aggrieved applicant who follows the appellate procedure provided by the
Ordinance risks foreclosing his opportunity. Id.
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that a discretionary vehicle such as a state's common law writ
of certiorari stands as an adequate substitute for an explicit
system of swift judicial review set out in the licensing law de-
fies credibility.' Assuming Freedman applies to these cases,
these ordinances defy Freedman's clear demand for a special-
ized system of prompt judicial review on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Both the policy behind the Freedman safeguards and Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion in FW/PBS provide support for the
proposition that the prompt judicial review safeguard requires
a judicial decision. An ordinance which contains no provision
for a judicial determination offers the legislative body too great
an opportunity to suppress speech by manipulating loose stan-
dards or by delaying action. As it stands now, while judicial re-
lief may come swiftly in some states and the period of silence
may be negligible, in other states the period may be more sub-
stantial. In either case, the result is still suppression of pro-
tected expression. This grave risk can only be abated by time-
restricted processes and explicit provisions making access to a
prompt judicial determination available.
J. David Guerrera
" See supra note 231 and accompanying text (criticizing the use of extraordi-
nary writs as a means of providing judicial review in prior restraint cases).
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